Prediction of adversarial course of actions (COA) is critical to many applications including: crime prediction, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) threat prediction, and terrorism attack prevention. Researchers have shown that integrating behavior features (or preferences/patterns/modes) into prediction systems, which utilize random process theory and likelihood estimation calculations, can improve prediction accuracy. However, these calculations currently assume behavior features that are static and will not change during a long time horizon, which make such models difficult to adapt to adversary behavior feature changes. This paper provides an approach for dynamically predicting changes of behavior features utilizing the tenets of game theory. An example scenario and extensive simulations illustrate the feature prediction capability of this model.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, substantial effort has been dedicated to predicting possible adversary's course of actions (COA) under hostile environments. Point-pattern-based density models are popular tools for such research areas. Since it is well known that adversarial actions tend to cluster according to geography preferences and timing features, it is natural to pay attention to clustering of COAs over the geographical sites and assume such clustering will persist over a long enough time horizon so that prediction is possible. For example, a popular and fundamental assumption in crime prediction system is "journey to crime" [1] , which believes that COA initiators tend to choose geographically closer sites to start the next COA. This assumption provides the basis for various "hot-spot" prediction techniques [2] [3] [4] , which are all branches of point-pattern-based density models. Recently, the most widely used method is the Spatial and Temporal Analysis of Crime (STAC) program [2] that tries to fit crimes points into ellipses. There are additional hotspot methods [3] [4] , and some of them apply kernel density estimation and achieve reasonable approximation benefits.
Liu and Brown [5] extend crime clustering methods by incorporating offenders' preferences in site selections and have greatly advanced prediction techniques. Note that such preferences are not only geographical preferences discussed above in "journey to crime" assumption, but also any possible features such as "population per square mile", "average annual household income", "percentage of male people", "average age", etc. The reasonability of Liu and Brown's viewpoint lies in the research results [6] [7] [8] [9] from many scientists and experienced police officers, which find that the likelihood of an incident at a specified site is based on not only past intensity, but also various geographical/temporal/social/economic features. Starting from this, Liu and Brown suggest that people should first choose several effective features/patterns from all possible features/patterns according to statistical data, then expand traditional prediction methods (mainly based on geographical features) to a newer model which considers multi-dimensional features. These multi-dimensional features allow probabilities to be calculated based on more information, which then are incorporated and redeployed over a new spatial-temporal horizon. In other words, traditional methods tend to calculate the event intensity only in geographic space that results in that event intensity simply as the expected number of accumulated events at alternative sites. Liu and Brown's model calculates the event intensity in an expanded multi-dimensional feature space, which calculates the potential of alternative sites to attract future events based on multidimensional feature information, not just traditional geographic features. According to the experiment on crime data collected in Richmond, VA, 1997, Liu and Brown's model achieves higher prediction accuracy than traditional models.
However, Liu and Brown's model assumes that the features are fixed once they are identified. We use an example to illustrate this. If via past statistical data it is found that "the distance to gas station" is an effective feature, this feature will always be taken into account even if later the criminals change their pattern so that "the distance to a school" becomes the new effective feature for predicting their behaviors. The reason why the criminals wished to change their behavior pattern is that they find that policemen already noticed the old feature and prepared for it. The criminals decide that continuing old COA pattern will bring too high risks. The direct result of this feature change is that Liu and Brown's prediction system can not deal with possible changes of COA features. Even if the model is modified such that after each time step the effective features should be chosen again, there will still be significant delay in identifying such changes of features. The method of identifying effective features is based on statistical data to date. Only after the changes persist long enough is it possible to detect such changes, not to mention predicting such changes.
When enemies are unorganized and non-intelligent, the occurrences of COAs will be somewhat independent, which might make the whole scenario fit some probability model such as Poisson or Normal distribution, etc. In addition, because of implicit independency or uncorrelation, the corresponding probability distribution will often have long enough persistency, which makes the traditional assumption "the preferences/features will persist over time horizon" reasonable. This is the reason why Liu and Brown's model is very efficient for crime prediction. Crimes over a large enough district without a dominating gang or significant attacks over a country without a headquarters are typical examples of such unorganized and non-intelligent enemy.
However, if the enemy is a well-structured and has an intelligent organization, the scenario will be largely different. The enemy's behavior will not exhibit randomness. The enemy might purposely choose COA time and site, perform such COA, calculate the loss and gain of last stage, and then determine the next stage's action. If necessary, they might even choose a different site for every stage, which will not display any traditional "geographical preference". In such cases, it is not reasonable to use past features to predict future COAs, because applying out-of-date features to predict "surprise attack" would not be valid.
In brief, in modern adversarial environments, two reasons cause the possibility of "surprise attack": 1) the offense team's intelligence and ability to change behavior features; and 2) the defense team's inability to predict changes of enemy COA features. Once changes of feature happen, there will be surprise attacks and the defense team will suffer.
We propose to extend Liu and Brown's model by applying game theory to predicting the possible changes of features. This is because the basic logic of game theory is to predict ahead via all available information, including past data and possible choices at the current stage. It does not need to wait for the enemy's change happening first without delay. In addition, such prediction is often self-enforcing [15] due to the properties of Nash solutions which assumes that the models are trustable. Via game theory, it can be anticipated that surprise attacks will be reduced and many attacks will lose the element of surprise. So we wish to fuse a new prediction technique/feature with game theory. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we will summarize the technical approach, which includes problem description, benefit updating mechanisms, objective functions, and calculation of optimal control strategies. Section 3 describes the experimental results and explanations. Section 4 provides conclusions for the paper. The paper focuses on applying game theory to update features.
TECHNICAL APPROACH OF APPLYING GAME THEORY TO UPDATE FEATURES
Suppose a military or criminal operation is ongoing in a "scene", say a city district. Fighting people in this scene belong to two opposing forces, labeled as Blue and Red, respectively. The two teams have different objective functions and the objective functions are negatively coupled since they are adversaries to each other. Suppose the Red team tries to impose COAs on Blue team, and the Blue team is on a position of defense. Each team wishes to maximize its benefit according to some objective function. According to past experiences, if Red applies a change of behavior feature and Blue can not anticipate it, Blue will suffer greatly. If Blue anticipates such changes in advance and prepares for it, Blue will suffer less, which is desired for Blue. Due to the tight coupling among Blue and Red, a two-player game will be a reasonable model.
Let ( )
N k denote the number of elements in the applicable behavior feature (or preference/pattern/mode) set of Red attack, at time step k . Each element in this set is a feature that is possibly applied by Red. In some cases, ( ) N k might be very large and it is inapplicable to make all the features active in prediction probability calculation. This makes it necessary to select some "active features" from the overall applicable feature set. The reasons lie in two aspects. The first is that computation complexity might easily fail when the number of effective features expands, since the number of active features corresponds to the dimensionality of the description space, according to Liu and Brown [5] .
The other reason is that in the real world, the active behavior patterns are rather limited. Imagine the following. A commander of a terrorist group wishes to produce a large loss and terror in a designated district. He provides an instruction for his team members, in which he lists some helpful tips as follows:.
TIP List:
(1) Avoid being too close to a police station.
(2) Try to perform actions around 4:00AM.
(3) Bomb should be timed to blast after at least one hour.
(4) Try to put bomb in crowded areas. At this stage we try to choose restaurants so that no one dares to have meals outside. At the next stage we might choose supermarkets.
(5) Don't plan too many attacks in one district. However, if the policemen strongly believe that we will never perform a second attack at the same site, we can also surprise them. is assigned by Blue and is not necessarily equal to m . w is a coupling factor matrix [21] which determines the relationship between the two players. In this case, the game players are enemies of each other thus w is P k is the capability that m i th feature predicts the whole data set and will be calculated according to regression statistics [10] . We only describe the basic procedure here. For details, see [10] . First, calculate ( )
P k for the highest priority feature in the selected feature set according to 1 1 ( ) ( )
where SSR is the abbreviation of Regression Sum of Squares, which is a concept in statistics theory. SSR 's definition and calculation can be found in any standard statistics textbook. Second, calculate 
where
is the benefit for Blue preparing for 
implies that the more accurately Blue predicts, the higher the efficiency of Blue. 
where all variables are defined symmetrically.
For simplicity, we denote 
EXPERIMENTS
We use simulations to investigate whether the model built in Section 2 has the capability to predict possible changes of behaviors of enemy features/patterns. To simplify the calculation and ensure better illustration, in the simulated scenario ( ) N k is three and ( ) ( ) 2
Assume the set consists of three independent features (thus priority actually does not make difference). If the variable NaskOK is -5, it implies that the result for this time step is a pure Nash equilibrium. In this experiment, a suboptimal solution is the result of traditional likelihood estimation [14] .
A typical simulation result is shown in Fig. 1 . We can see that in Fig 1 (for all cases (a), (b) , or (c)), at each time step with a Nash solution, Blue successfully predicts the selection of Red, even if Red is quickly switching its choices (which is very much like the modern terrorism case "hit-and-run"). However, when there does not exist a pure Nash solution, Blue has to guess and might make errors in prediction. Two examples are time step 9 and time step 10. At time step 9 Blue's guess is correct, while at time step 10 Blue makes a mistake. Note that in Fig. 1(b) when there is no pure Nash Equilibrium, Blue directly applies likelihood techniques to estimate the choices of Red for the next time step. However, the Red force is intelligent, so they insist on a choice which "seems not good if being considered via expectation" and fools Blue successfully. In Figure 1 , for most of the times even if there is no pure Nash, Blue's guess is still largely correct. The result which seems most like "hit-and-run" scenarios is shown in Fig. 3 . Red switches it's choices almost every time instant. However, at the same time Red keeps one feature unchanged for the whole procedure, which makes this scenario the most difficult to detect. From this result in Figure 3 , we can see that this complex (even seems to be contradictory) strategy successfully disturbs Blue's predictions. In our simulations, this is the worst case (for Blue). 
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we explained the importance of applying game theory to existing prediction systems. We analyzed why it is difficult for existing prediction systems to anticipate surprise attacks and concluded that prediction game-theoretic models need to incorporate (1) enemy's intelligence and (2) existing systems' inability to predict changes of enemy behavior patterns based solely on past information. We used game theory's ability to "step ahead" to infer possible changes of enemy behavior features. We built up the model for a feature prediction game using a notional feature of surprise attack where repeated behaviors lose the element of surprise. Extensive simulations were performed to verify and illustrate the benefits of this model.
